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Summary 
 
Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing 
number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with 
connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case 
of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. 
Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning 
democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-
government. Having been one of the least connected countries in 
the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the 
Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in 
place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework 
of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and 
potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital 
technologies.  
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7 
The potential benefits of 
digitalization 
Through the rapid digitalization of the developing world a 
plethora of opportunities and pitfalls are evolving before our eyes. 
The rapid expansion of internet connectivity is connecting ever 
more people to an international world of business, discourse and 
entertainment. Thus, a crucial aspect for development in the years 
to come will be the harnessing of the benefits, as well as mitigating 
the downsides that inherently follow in the wake of internet access. 
As a key part of this the concept of cyber security comes to the 
fore. As the developed world struggles with how to secure its digital 
infrastructure and the processes that depend on it, the developing 
worlds do as well. This has led to an emerging idea of Cyber 
Security Capacity Building, wherein donor states attempt to 
strengthen the ability of developing states to govern and protect 
its cyberspace. 
In this paper, we have used the framework of Cyber Security 
Capacity Building (CCB) proposed by Klimburg and Zylberberg 
(2016), as it takes a broader approach to cyber security. Other 
approaches tend to focus more exclusively on national security, 
while CCB considers the wider economical and societal impacts of 
digitization.  The rationale for this concept is an idea that cyber 
security impacts states and donors through three underlying 
mechanisms. In reverse order, they are 1) the ability of digital 
technologies to promote freedom, by creating spaces for 
expression of thought and debates that are free from 
governmental constraints. 2) By using CCB to strengthen the 
international cyber security architecture. As the Internet is an 
online arena the security is only as strong as the weakest link, 
improving developing states will therefore improve the structure 
globally. And finally, 3) the increasing importance of digitalization 
and ICT in fostering economic and societal development, and the 
need for Cyber Security to protect these benefits.2  It is this final 
element we will now turn to, and which will be the focus of this 
                                                            
2 Klimburg, Zylberberg: 2016 
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8 
paper, by addressing the various ways in which digital technologies 
are promoting development. 
At the most basic level expanding ICT and broadband 
infrastructure has been linked to growth in GDP. While noting 
that there might be issues of causality, and there has been varying 
numbers reported, the most frequently cited number comes from 
the ITU which states that a 10% increase in Broadband coverage 
correlates with a 1.38% increase in GDP.3  As the Internet is a global 
marketplace, connecting to it improves the ability of developing 
states to connect consumers, producers, and ordinary citizens. The 
digital economy contributed an estimated 4 trillion US dollars in 
2016, and grew by 10%, a rate of growth that outstrips the overall 
G20 economy.4  Even more important is its contribution in 
developing countries, where a study has suggested that ICT might 
have contributed as much as a quarter of the growth in developing 
countries at the start of the millennium.5 
Compounding the importance of ICT in promoting growth is 
the speed of diffusion. While ICT is creating possibilities for 
growth, it is also doing so for more people far faster than 
traditional expansion of infrastructure. Since the dawn of 
electricity and the development of electricity grids, over a hundred 
years ago, only 17% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa are 
connected to such a grid. As a contrast about 70% are by now 
connected to the Internet in some form or another, a mere 23 
years after the technology became commercialized.6 This is of 
course a simplification, as the degree of coverage varies 
substantially, but it highlights the great potential of ICT’s in 
developing and transforming economies.  The sheer pace of the 
expansion of Internet are creating new forms of employment and 
means of communication and exchange, such as mobile banking 
and mobile money in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
                                                            
3 (ITU, 2012). 
4 (WEF, 2015). 
5 Ibid 
6 http://systemtransformation-
sdg.gesi.org/160608_GeSI_SystemTransformation.pdf  
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9 
ICT and the Sustainable Development Goals   
 
Another method of measuring potential impact is to move beyond 
simply economic numbers and look at how ICT relate to 
development in a larger setting. One such setting is to look at how 
ICT impact on key benchmark goals for development. The main 
such goals are the UN sustainable development goals, which 
consists of 169 targets distributed among 17 “goals”. These goals 
are meant as a continuation of the UN millennial goals, which were 
claimed as a success in terms of fostering development and 
improving living conditions globally.7 
ICT works towards the sustainable development goals through 
two avenues: on the one hand, it is singled out as one of the 169 
“sub targets” and is therefore a development target on its own. 
Added as a part of the aim to improve industry and infrastructure 
the issue has been framed in the following manner by the UN 
Economic and Social Council: 
71. Infrastructure and economic development also rely on 
information and Communications technology. Mobile cellular 
services have spread rapidly around the world, allowing people 
in previously unconnected areas to join the global information 
society. By 2015, the percentage of the population living in 
areas covered by mobile broadband network s stood at 69 per 
cent globally. In rural areas, the share was only 29 per cent.8 
As a result, one the stated targets for the UN goal pertaining to 
Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure is to “Significantly 
increase access to information and communications technology 
and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the 
Internet in least developed countries by 2020”.9 
While ICT and digitalization is thus an integrated part of the 
sustainable development goals, the by-effects of digitalization will 
secure the larger gains. As ICT spreads and societies connect to the 
Internet there is widespread optimism regarding the possibilities 
                                                            
7 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/mdgmomentum.shtml 
8 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/2016/75&Lang=E 
9 UN 
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10 
for developing countries to transform their societies. While ICT 
and digitalization is tied in to development in a direct manner, the 
larger perceived value lies in the ability of digitalization to help 
reach the development goals in other areas as well. The optimism 
for ICT to transform developing societies is substantial, and 
theories abound on how it can be done. A 2016 report from the 
Global E-Sustainability Initiative is markedly bullish about the 
potential for ICT’s to push developed countries further along. 
Among the drastic transformative effects that are hypothesized 
are reductions of yearly traffic fatalities by 720.000 globally, of 
improving healthcare for 1.2 billion people and potential carbon 
emission reductions by close to 20%. The report also highlights the 
possibilities ICT offers in terms of education, fostering economic 
growth, and building smart cities.10  
The benefits of digitalization in Myanmar  
 
In 2016 the first freely elected Myanmar Parliament convened for 
the first time, after being under the thumb of military rule for over 
half a century. As the country has recently emerged from 
oppressive rule at the hands of the military junta, it has also 
moved towards a democratization of the society.11  In coexistence 
with this move towards a more open society the country has also 
tried to develop its economy and its capabilities on several issues, 
among these connecting to the internet. Myanmar has moved 
rapidly from one of the countries with the least ICT-coverage in 
the world to one where connectivity is growing at an 
unprecedented pace.12  In 2011 the country was rated as the second-
least connected country in the world, beating only North Korea, 
with an Internet penetration of under 1%. The rapid connectivity is 
part of a government-initiated effort at modernizing the country 
                                                            
10 (http://systemtransformation-
sdg.gesi.org/160608_GeSI_SystemTransformation.pdf 
11 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/02/world/asia/first-freely-elected-
parliament-after-decades-of-military-rule-opens-in-
myanmar.html?_r=0 
12 http://www.ictworks.org/2015/09/30/wow-myanmar-is-going-straight-
to-smartphones/ 
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11 
that started in parallel with the democratization in 2011.13  By the 
end of 2015 the number of subscribers in the country had 
ballooned into almost 50%, indicating an increase in internet 
subscribers of around 300% yearly. The growth has been mostly 
related to smartphones, which make up around 80% percent of all 
mobile phones in the country, a share that is higher than in most 
developed countries.14  This has in turn lead to a growing number 
of services that are based upon ICT. 
An area that has been noted for its considerable potential in 
development is e-commerce and online banking, with banking 
penetration in Myanmar as low as 10% in urban areas and even 
lower in rural areas.15  The Central Bank has already taken steps 
towards ensuring that this can be utilized, publishing a directive in 
2013 that allows telecommunication suppliers to provide mobile 
money solutions as well.16  One example is Wave Money, a mobile-
money operating company raised as a cooperation by the Telenor 
group and Yoma bank which has started operating in the 
country.17  The potential benefits of supplying previously 
unbanked regions with access to banking is potentially be large, as 
the existence of safe opportunities for saving and applying for 
credit could lead to more widespread economic development. 
In cooperation with the Asian Development Bank Myanmar has 
looked at the possibility of utilizing e-governance as a method of 
overcoming issues stemming from the country’s diverse 
geography, lagging development and diversity. E-government has 
the potential of enhancing efficiency and transparency, if properly 
managed and based on a solid foundation, which could have great 
benefits for any country.1819 
 
                                                            
13 Calderaro 
14 http://www.ictworks.org/2015/09/30/wow-myanmar-is-going-straight-
to-smartphones/ 
15 SWIA 
16 Ibid 
17 https://www.wavemoney.com.mm/about-us/) 
18https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-
document/161546/47158-001-tacr-01.pdf 
19 http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/8/10/2016/id-8661 
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13 
Digital threats in developing 
countries   
While connecting developing countries is potentially hugely 
beneficial, and able to unlock large potential for growth, there are a 
long list of perils involved in digitalization. Some of these are 
common for all countries, yet other are more unique for developing 
countries. The positive effects of digitalization are therefore 
dependent on an environment that enables these positive effects 
to manifest themselves. This is dependent on several factors, not 
only building digital infrastructure, but making sure that this 
infrastructure has a sufficient capacity, ownership issues, such as 
monopolies or oligopolies and the expansion of networks away 
from the urban areas where they tend to cluster.20  Some of the 
main challenges has been identified, however, and measures to 
mitigate these are taking form. The aforementioned GeSi-report 
outlines three main areas of concern for developing countries: lack 
of political knowledge and appropriate regulation, lack of funding 
and financial incentives to invest in these technologies and lack of 
knowledge in the wider population, both in terms of user-skills and 
expertise.21 
For developing countries, the issue of cyber security is made 
more prominent by the fact that the very services that contribute 
to increased efficiency and economic gains are also the ones that 
are most vulnerable to attacks and penetrations. Three main areas 
have been identified that both hold great potential economic gains 
but also severe security risk:22 
1 :  Backend systems that concentrate information for 
companies and government (e-government). This has been shown 
                                                            
20 Klimburg, Zylberberg 
21 (http://systemtransformation-
sdg.gesi.org/160608_GeSI_SystemTransformation.pdf 
22 Klimburg, Zylberberg 
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14 
to produce great efficiency gains, but also to concentrate 
information which again makes it a more valuable target.23 
2:  The potential of leapfrogging and cloud-computing leading 
to even greater concentration of information, but also new and 
changing security challenges. 24 
3:  Mobile money and e-commerce, which lets underbanked or 
unbanked areas access money and credit, but which also adds great 
potential monetary benefits for cybercriminals.25  This has 
normally been a more pressing issue in the developed world, but 
recent cases such as the robbery of the Bangladesh National Bank 
is a reminder that as capacity develops the issue will move towards 
less developed regions as well.26 
The potential harm for unsuccessful digitalization goes beyond 
mere untapped potential, the lack of stable reliable access can in 
fact increase the divide between the developing and the developed 
world. Tabira and Otieno (2017) shows how the development goal 
of “quality education for all” can be hampered by reliance on ICT 
for teaching and access. They found that due to uneven connection 
and power shortages education in Kenya in fact suffered by 
implementing ICT-based teachings, as contrasted to traditional 
teaching. An ill-managed switch meant teachers was unable to 
cope with the environment, and students as a result lost interest. 
This points to ICT potentially widening the divide between 
developed and developing, at least in terms of education, as the 
former has instant access to a wealth of information while the 
latter gets left behind by insufficient infrastructure.27 Put in a 
larger context this might raise some concerning issue on the over 
reliance on ICT to reach development goals. Some of the issues 
hampering development, such as bad infrastructure and the need 
for regulation reform will not go away because of digitalization, in 
fact they might get worse. This underlines the importance of a 
wider set of issues, such as cyber security, as an integrated part of 
                                                            
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
26 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/business/dealbook/north-korea-
linked-to-digital-thefts-from-global-banks.html?_r=0 
27  http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11625-017-0422-8 
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15 
a development agenda, as the creation of secure networks is crucial 
to harvest the potential benefits. 
At the same time, recent developments have highlighted the 
vulnerabilities of developing countries, particularly the spread of 
the “WannaCry” ransomware in May 2017. The ransomware 
propagated by utilizing an exposed vulnerability in the Microsoft 
operating system that had been patched months prior. However, 
the updates and patches that protected against the malware was 
phased out for older versions, or not provided altogether for 
pirated versions. The result was a much larger spread of the 
ransomware in states like China and Russia, which relied heavily on 
particularly pirated operating systems.28  Generally older versions 
of operating systems are more common in countries that have less 
of the required capital needed to upgrade them. As an example 
Windows 7, the operating system that was most vulnerable to the 
WannaCry attack, enjoys a 55% market share in Africa - being by 
far the most popular operating system - while it has a market 
share of around 40% in Europe and trending downwards, also 
recently being overtaken by windows 10 as the most widely used 
operating system.29  This points towards a scenario wherein 
developing countries get stuck with ageing and increasingly 
outdated software, which could pose a huge security risk. Without 
strong institutions and organizations related to cyber security 
that could step up in the event of a crisis the consequences could 
potentially be enormous.30  It is therefore imperative that any 
move towards digitalization is accompanied by a strong and 
persistent focus on cyber security to prevent the gains from 
connecting to the global Internet economy to be outweighed by 
the security risks. 
While the most pressing issue is the emergence of risks within 
the developing countries, the emergence of ICT in a broader range 
of countries also raise issues relating to the international 
                                                            
28 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/12/global-cyber-
attack-ransomware-nsa-uk-nhs 
29 http://gs.statcounter.com/os-version-market-
share/windows/desktop/europe/#monthly-201605-201705 
30 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2017/May/in-wake-of-
wannacry-attacks--un-cybersecurity-expert-discusses-internet-
safety.html 
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16 
governance-structure. The current management of the Internet is 
being done by groups of private sector, civil society and 
government in a model described as Multi-Stakeholder Model 
(MSM). This model has come under increasing pressure from a 
coalition of authoritarian and developing countries, led by China 
and Russia, stressing the importance of state stability over all 
other concerns. This movement, described as Cyber Sovereignty 
has resulted in a polarized debate between the two camps.31  For 
developing countries an important issue is their limited ability to 
participate in the existing debates, mainly caused by logistical and 
financial problems: as the meetings are taken place all over the 
globe, and include difficult technical questions that necessitate the 
participation of devoted specialists.32 
This is linked to the related question of whether the Internet is 
used to promote freedom of expression and other freedoms, or as a 
vehicle for repression. This question also stresses the need of 
adding civil society into the governance of the Internet.33  These 
are issues that have been promoted in the EU cyber strategy as 
well, and are linked to the idea of the Internet as an enabler of 
liberal democracies.34  A global trend is for cyber-attacks to not 
only target industry and governments, but also Civil Society 
Organizations, who often do not have the resources to defend 
themselves against these attacks, presenting a large threat 
against organizations working for human rights and keeping the 
government responsible. Furthermore, these attacks are often 
characterized by low degree of technical sophistication, and more 
advanced social engineering aspects using so-called spear-phishing 
techniques to obtain information.35  However, the tools and skills 
required to protect from these types of surveillance are widely 
available for those with the knowledge to find them. Organizations 
such as the Tactical Technology Collective even offer these 
packages in Burmese.36  Raising awareness in developing societies 
about both the risks of internet connectivity, and the many cheap 
                                                            
31 Klimburg, Zylberberg 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 JOIN, 2013 
35 Citizen Lab, https://targetedthreats.net/ 
36 SWIA 
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and free tools that mitigate these risks are an important step in 
building a solid civil society. 
 
The troubling cyber landscape in Myanmar   
 
As mentioned Myanmar has over the last years seen one of the 
most rapid and comprehensive extensions in digital coverage 
ever.37  It should therefore come as no surprise that the country 
still has unresolved issues relating to the securing and managing 
of this transition. A further complicating element is that 
Myanmar is undergoing this rapid transformation at the same 
time as the country is undergoing a profound political transition 
as well. Adding internet connectivity as the same time as the 
country transitions from being run by its military junta to a more 
democratic form of governance is heightening the risk that the 
technology will be used to exert government control and 
surveillance.38 
Key actors 
 
As the government is limited in both its capacity and its resources, 
calls have been made for large international companies to help 
implement security in the country. As smaller businesses do not 
have the knowledge or ability to establish sufficiently secure 
practices this is an area where large Multinational ICT-companies 
could (and should) help develop capabilities.39   
A key role is thus likely to be played by commercial actors, in 
particular the differing telecoms operators that will be included in 
the process. After a 2012 licensing-round the licenses were awarded 
to Qatari telecoms-operator Ooredoo and Norwegian operator 
                                                            
37 Calderaro 
38 Calderaro 
39 SWIA 
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18 
Telenor.40  In Myanmar, there has been a shared responsibility for 
the development of the telecommunications sector: while the 
government is focused on developing laws and regulations 
extending connectivity has fallen into the hands of foreign 
companies. A large part of the task is thus dependent on the 
companies doing so in a manner that highlights their corporate 
social responsibility. A 2013 Human Rights Watch report 
underlined the potential positive impacts of the Internet and 
digitalization in societies such as Myanmar. However, the report 
also stressed the risk that this technology would be used by the 
regime to crack down on dissent, used for illegal surveillance and as 
a way to enforce censorship. The call was for companies involved in 
improving the ICT-infrastructure in Myanmar to refrain from 
cooperating with the government on matters that would 
undermine the rights of its citizens.41   
Whether the companies do so are up for debate. The most 
concerning of the companies is Ooredoo, which has no clear 
published guideline/ and a spotty record on protecting the rights 
of its users. The company in fact has a history of accepting 
censorship by the Qatari government and installing filters in 
accordance with the wishes of autocratic regimes. For Ooredoo 
another key issue is the fact that the company is Muslim, in a 
country with increasing ethno-religious tensions between 
Muslims and Buddhists. So far this has only resulted in smaller 
incidents, but as tension increases it is an area that is worth 
watching.42  Telenor on the other hand is widely regarded as 
having one of the more advanced policies on social responsibility, 
however there are some concerns raised over its shutting down of 
its services at the behest of the Thai military Junta in 2014. There 
also some uncertainties over the extent to which Telenor is willing 
to pass information over to the government and whether these 
policies are clearly enough formulated to withstand potential 
pressures.43   
                                                            
40 Calderaro 
41 https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/19/reforming-
telecommunications-burma/human-rights-and-responsible-investment-
mobile 
42 Calderaro 
43 Ibid 
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Cybercrime 
 
In the Asia-Pacific region there exists a large and partly 
sophisticated cybercriminal element, while the national 
approaches to cybercrime are uneven. In several countries 
cybercriminal regulation is being used either as a mean to achieve 
political suppression of dissident voices, or as a mean to prevent 
unwanted content such as pornography and gambling.44 As a 
result, the prosecution and investigation of cyber criminals looking 
for financial profit is scarce. An important development in 
cybercrime is the fluid nature of the operations, which tends to 
move towards the points of least resistance. Countries that have 
few laws covering cybercrime, or insufficient enforcement of these 
laws, are being used as staging arenas for attacks on other nations 
in the region. Cybercrime is therefore emerging as a distinctly 
transnational issue that needs to be addressed through 
cooperation and coordination. Myanmar is one of the countries 
that have been identified as such a country, and there are efforts 
by countries with more developed capabilities, such as the US, 
Japan, South Korea and Australia, to develop the cybercrime 
prevention capabilities in Myanmar.45   
The global nature of the Internet means that criminals often 
operate outside of the country they target, and this is being used 
by foreign actors to set up branches of illegal activity in other 
countries. This is a novel, if distinct, feature of Asian cyber-politics 
as both China and North Korea have been accused of staging 
operations from within other countries. A 2014 Chinese hacking 
organization was exposed and arrested in Kenya in 2014, 
apparently having set up an advanced cybercrime operation with 
up to 80 members in what was described as “military style 
dormitories”.46  A more recent example is the exposure of North 
Korean operations from within China, the very same organization 
that is alleged to be behind the robbery of the Bangladesh Central 
Bank.47  This creates issues both in terms of cybercrime prevention 
                                                            
44 ASPI, 2016 
45 Ibid 
46   http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30327412 
47 http://www.businessinsider.com/r-exclusive-north-koreas-unit-180-
the-cyber-warfare-cell-that-worries-the-west-2017-5?r=US&IR=T&IR=T 
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and international politics, as states stage attacks on each other 
interests from within third-party states. States with 
underdeveloped regulation and cyber-capabilities is likely to be 
attractive spots as such third-party staging grounds. 
More concerning for domestic stability in Myanmar is the 
connection between these cybercriminal elements and various 
political forces operating in the country. The lack of government 
provided security, as well as law and order, has resulted in an 
environment that spurs the growth of criminal gangs, and 
connects them to the political elite. This creates a hostile 
environment for legitimate businesses to compete in, hampering 
growth and development.48  The government has criminalized 
hacking, but the law, dating back to 2004, is ill-suited to more 
recent challenges. At the same time, a new cybercrime law has been 
in development for some time, yet it is not implemented as of this 
date.49   
As Myanmar struggles with an unstable political situation, and 
therefore limitations with its application of the rule of law, the 
country is seeing the emergence of a broad range of criminal issues, 
among them cyberattacks. The transition from military rule to a 
more democratic form of government, along with the recurring 
theme of ethnic conflict, creates an environment that is favorable 
to criminals. One of the two issues that is singled out in a 2016 
report as particularly troubling is cybercrime, along with financial 
crime.50  Cybercrime is an existing, and growing, concern in 
Myanmar. As the growth in cybercrime rapidly outpaces the 
growth in digital transactions globally the issue of criminal 
activities is set to grow in importance over the coming years. Due 
to the fluid nature of these criminal activities states with lacking 
legal frameworks and enforcements like Myanmar is likely to see a 
disproportional part of this growth. 51 
                                                            
48 BMI research 2016 
49 SWIA 
50 BMI research 2016 
51 https://www.threatmetrix.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/cybercrime-2016-q1-
1492588964.pdf?_ga=2.203348887.767081945.1493862414-
973637201.1493760913 
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Social  issues 
 
Myanmar is still struggling to cope with various ethnic 
conflicts, with separatist insurgencies raging in the country's 
border regions to the north and the east. While the intensity of 
the conflicts has been falling over the recent years, there are still 
minor clashes occurring from time to time.52  Myanmar is one of 
the most ethnically and culturally diverse countries in the region, 
with a persistent tension between the Burman central 
government and the various minorities. The most well-known 
tension runs between the Buddhist majority, and the ethnic 
Rohingya Muslim minority. A tension that has been transferred 
into the cyber realm with a growing number of incidents of hate-
speech.53  A glaring problem in Myanmar’s online world is in this 
sense the addition of social media to an already combustible ethnic 
situation. This mixture has already led to violent riots with two 
casualties as the result of rumors spread online.54  Since then hate 
speech has continued to spread and is becoming an increasingly 
pressing problem. A field study made by the SWIA revealed that 
most of the hate speech was directed towards the Muslim 
majority, with a significant part of the hate speech including calls 
for violence and even killing of Muslims.55  The discrimination is 
not limited to Muslim minorities, but it remains the most glaring 
example of persecution in the country.56 
The socio-political nexus 
 
The cultural and ethnic tensions in cyberspace feeds into 
existing political fissures. Myanmar has at multiple points in its 
history seen control over information and access being used 
politically by actors. Back in 2010 Myanmar was on the receiving 
end of what was at the time one of the largest Distributed Denial 
                                                            
52 BMI research 2016 
53 SWIA 
54 Calderaro 
55 SWIA 
56 Ibid 
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22 
of Service-attacks (DDoS) ever recorded. The attacks, which 
consists of flooding connection points with massive amounts of 
online traffic until they collapse, came in the run-up to the 2010 
general election.57  As the infrastructure at the time was dependent 
on a single submarine fiber-optic cable, the attack succeeded in 
disconnecting the entire country from the Internet. The 
connection at the time was so limited that the attack was several 
hundred times larger than needed to shut down the connection.58  
At the time, political or geopolitical DDoS was a very rare 
occurrence, and this fact remains true today. There are only a 
handful of DDoS-attacks that has been knowingly attributed to 
political actors, with the attacks on Estonia in 2010 and Georgia in 
2008 the most famous examples.59  While the source of the attacks 
has not been made public to this date, strong suspicion has been 
directed towards the Burmese military junta that governed the 
country, particularly as dissident websites hosted outside of 
Myanmar had been targeted earlier in the year.60  There were also 
similar accusations raised at the Burmese military and 
government following restrictions of access and information in 
2007. 61  
Since the democratization these large operations stopping the 
flow of information altogether has stopped. As the country has 
connected to the internet they have been allowed access to a 
wealth of information they did not previously have access to, 
resulting in a renaissance of sorts for independent media outlets 
and civil society groups. Despite this apparent positive 
development there are huge concerns relating to the security of 
these websites. There are also questions regarding whether 
stopping dissent has merely taken on another form. The most 
concerning developments have been the rise of vigilante groups 
pushing a nationalistic and authoritarian agenda by attacking 
websites and news outlets that are critical of the government, or in 
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some way positive to the country’s Muslim minority.62  The most 
active of these group has been identified as the “Blink Hacker 
Group”, and has targeted numerous media websites over the last 
few years. This group has been linked to the Myanmar military by 
an independent investigation undertaken by research-firm 
Unleashed. Their report on the attacks tied the hacker-collective 
to military servers and training facilities, while the group itself has 
admitted on Facebook that it consists in part of “Pro-government” 
members, which is evident in its pushing of a ultra-nationalistic 
agenda.63  Coupled with the rise of Islamophobia and the use of 
social media as an instigator of violence between differing ethnic 
groups, and mainly aimed towards the ethnic Rohingya-minority, 
there are clear warning signs that cyber security will be crucial 
towards ensuring free speech and avoiding spiraling ethnic 
conflicts in the years to come.  
If the regulatory framework remains unconvincing some of this 
responsibility may again fall into the hands of companies running 
the infrastructure. Using hacking and digital technologies for 
political gains is not new however, and prevention is tricky. Some 
ICT-companies have tried to solve the problem, and many more 
might be forced to. The most widely cited example is the 
Safaricom-case where the service provider took steps after the 
2007 Kenyan election. The election, which was disputed and 
coloured by a distinct ethnic element, resulted in an eruption of 
violence leaving over a 1000 dead. Later investigations unearthed 
that blogs and SMS had played a prominent role in the planning 
and inciting of violence, and in the runup to the 2013 election there 
were fears that a similar situation might develop. In the end 
Safaricom ended up issuing tough guidelines for bulk messaging in 
order to avoid for its services to be used as a means of organizing 
violence. While it remains unclear to what extent the effort helped, 
as most organizing went to other channels such as social media, it 
shows how companies might take responsibilities for the political 
messaging taking place on their platforms. 64 65 
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International outlook 
 
The trend in the region is like that in the broader world, as data 
is being used increasingly as a tool for states to promote their 
interests. What used to be operations for intelligence purposes are 
now being used more in line with political goals and as means to 
political ends.  While there have not been any cases comparable to 
the hack of the Democratic National Committee in the US 
elections, operations against Vietnam that coincided with rulings 
unfavorable to China on South China Sea issues shows that data is 
being politicized in Asia as well. This raises important question on 
how to approach cyber security, particularly as e-government, e-
commerce and IoT is likely to be ever more widespread and 
important.66   
 A 2015 FireEye investigation into the APT 30-group found that 
the group had been active in targeting ASEAN member-states (like 
Myanmar) for several years. While the group's targets are like 
those of the Chinese government, the group has not as of yet been 
definitely linked to any actor.67  The report also includes mention 
of attacks on an unnamed “regional customer” undergoing 
“significant political transition” and postulates that the attack 
was an attempt to gain knowledge into the degree of instability in 
the country. This could refer to other countries than Myanmar, 
but Myanmar is also more specifically referenced as one of the 
countries where it is likely that APT 30 is operating. 68  
Another intrusion was detected in late 2015, as Arbor Networks 
investigated what later came to be known as the “Trochilus”-
campaign. The tools used, and the scale of the campaign, indicated 
a sophisticated state-sponsored actor, with Arbor again 
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suggesting that it was a hacker group known as “Group 27” which 
also has been tied to China by several experts.69  
While both reports are hesitant at attributing China directly, 
the political context and historic relations between the two 
countries is a strong indicator. When Myanmar was a pariah-
state globally its relationship with its giant northern neighbor 
resembled that of a client state. China has been accused over the 
years of profiting from illegal trade in timber, gold, and Jade. 
However, the recent democratization has changed the relationship 
between the two countries, with Myanmar backpedaling on former 
agreements. The clearest example is the efforts in Kachin State, 
where China has had to take on a more active peace-promoting 
role and claims it is trying to live to its role as a “responsible world 
power”. Some has questioned the sincerity of these efforts, 
however, claiming that the main goal for China is to remain the 
dominant foreign influence in the country, and at all cost keep the 
west away. The northern parts of Myanmar could also potentially 
become crucial for Chinese regional efforts, such as the “One Belt, 
One Road”-project. As long as Chinese interests are prevalent in 
Myanmar, its presence is likely to be felt, and this would by all 
likelihood translate into the digital domain as well.70  These 
examples indicate that a healthy and secure internet might 
become a prime precondition for Myanmar to enjoy functioning 
sovereignty, particularly as the fragile political and social situation 
in the country gives opportunities for exploitation and pressure.  
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 Cyber vulnerabilities in 
Myanmar 
When addressing the question of Myanmar’s preparedness and 
development on the issue of cyber security, a starting point is 
mapping the landscape of digital infrastructure and its trajectory. 
This issue was raised in Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
report (2016) on cyber security preparedness in the region, namely 
the problems arising from a lack of understanding of one's own 
assets and needs. Countries have different structures 
underpinning the Internet, and different issues needed to be 
addressed to handle it. An example raised in said report is the 
difference between a country like China, where almost all services 
are state-owned, and Australia, where 90% of the infrastructure is 
in private hands. That these two countries are facing drastically 
different governmental challenges is clear, and no method can be 
said to cover both cases. Realizing what one has is the first step 
towards securing it.71  For Myanmar, as we shall see, the situation 
of depending on a limited set of state and private actors in driving 
the entire telecommunication sector should therefore frame the 
debate on policy. The first issue is the infrastructure providing 
internet access for the population. 
Infrastructure 
 
For Myanmar, the state of the infrastructure carrying the 
internet poses some distinct challenges and questions. Utilizing 
the World Bank’s division of infrastructure into three miles one 
can assess to what degree Myanmar is developing its capabilities. 
The first mile is where the internet enters the country, the middle 
is the distribution within the country and the final mile is the part 
where the coverage reaches the end users. Traditionally the issue 
for developing states has been the middle mile, as the focus is on 
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entrance points to countries and access in urban areas, while less 
effort is put into the distribution within countries.72   
The infrastructure in Myanmar is disproportionately based on 
mobile broadband access and not fixed broadband.73  The World 
Bank has highlighted this as an issue in several developing 
countries, as wireless alternatives are not a full substitute for 
fixed-line networks, often being more expensive and slower. This 
creates a subdivision of the Internet coverage into different 
leagues, with developing countries stuck with a lower quality 
coverage.74  Slower speeds again raise the vulnerability to attacks 
like DDOS-ing, which Myanmar, as mentioned above, has been the 
victim of in the past.  
Myanmar is a typical case of early-stage internet development, 
while there has been an immense growth in internet coverage 
nationally, through the building of mobile towers and mobile 
internet, the underlying structure and backbone of the Internet 
remains weak. This is important as most of the websites, both 
foreign and domestic, are based on servers outside the borders of 
Myanmar. A stable connection to the outside world is thus 
important to gain access to most of the websites residents want to 
access. Up until very recently Myanmar was served by a single 
submarine cable, creating both large vulnerabilities in the 
infrastructure and slow connection.75   
With regards to the infrastructure servicing Myanmar from 
abroad the government is in control of the sole Internet Exchange 
Point (IX) in the country (in fact a faux-IX, but functioning as one 
nonetheless). This meant that all data traffic moving in and out of 
the country was in the government's hands, inserting huge risks 
for privacy and data infiltration.76  The country was also served by 
a single submarine cable, which is a glaring vulnerability in any 
country’s cyber security setup as evident in the 2010 DDoS-attack 
and an accidental severing of the cable in 2007, both instances that 
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28 
left the country without Internet coverage for some time.77  
However recent developments have seen two new connections to 
the submarine cable network - through the SEA-ME-WE-5 
consortium and the Asia Africa Europe (AAE1) connection - in late 
2016 and early 2017, mitigating this vulnerability. These new 
connections will still be under government control however, 
meaning that the foundation for a secure and open Internet 
infrastructure is limited at best.78 
Regulation and politics 
 
In general Myanmar's cyber security “Maturity” is among the 
worst in the Asia-Pacific region. Reports have pointed to large 
issues and gaps in the approach to the issue. Beyond the military 
aspect of cyber security Myanmar is among the lowest scoring 
countries in all categories in a ASPI-report, highlighting a long list 
of issues that needs to be addressed.79  A shortage in skilled labor is 
one of the main issues, as the ICT sector is regulated and run by a 
small group of public employees tasked with managing the rapid 
transition. The digital transformation, coupled with the 
democratic transition, is dependent on the development of a long 
list of technical standards and regulation, as well as reinventing 
the educational system to meet new demands. On top of this the 
interconnected nature of the ICT sector, and the fact that 
Myanmar has already become entangled with foreign actors after 
years of isolation, points to the scope of the challenge Myanmar is 
facing to make the transition run smoothly.80  Moreover, while the 
government drafted a master plan for telecommunications in 2015 
its implementation has been severely postponed and uneven, 
undermining the efforts at creating a sound political environment. 
This is mirrored in the regulatory sector wherein the existing rules 
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and regulations are aimed at control and censorship, and not on 
cybercrime and related issues.81   
This is not particularly surprising, as the country recently was 
closed off from the rest of the world and with a legal framework 
aimed at different goals than today. In this context, the twin 
developments of democratization and digitization are asking a lot 
of the country, and they are likely to impact and shape the 
trajectory of each other. The result is often that even when the 
country follows recommendations from donors in shaping the 
process, key aspects may be omitted. An example can be taken from 
the development of the new telecommunications law in 2013, where 
the Myanmar Government circulated a draft in an open and 
inclusive process in the lines of the “best practice” approach of 
multistakeholder-approaches. As the report was written in 
English, however, it was clear that the intended audience was 
foreign companies and government, and not Burmese actors.82  
This example illustrates that the recent political history can shape 
and alter the processes that are supposedly “best”, as the 
underlying logic is not internalized by the actors who are supposed 
to see the processes through.  More disconcerting is the lack of 
transparency in educating and enabling the population to take 
part in the reform and understand its implications.83  Seen in a 
wider context there is little tradition in Myanmar for inclusive, 
transparent policy formulation, which is seen as the best practice 
when formulating digital policies.84   
As the challenges for the government in formulating a coherent 
policy from scratch are severe, several experts have pointed 
towards the international companies operating in Myanmar to 
take responsibility for the sector. One of the main concerns raised 
by the ASPI-report was the non-existent cooperation between 
private companies and the public regulators, which is the opposite 
of the recommended multi-stakeholder model of governance.85  For 
the companies, themselves adopting international standards in 
the absence of domestic ones has been pointed to as a potential 
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key factor in promoting sound governance long-term. For this to 
be done successfully holding companies like Telenor to their own 
standards abroad, even in challenging contexts, will therefore be of 
high importance.86 
International cooperation 
 
A subdivision of the political and regulatory capacity is a country's 
participation in international fora’s and programs. This is an area 
of importance in cyberspace, where the government challenges are 
often global in nature. There are large differences in the extent to 
which countries engage in multilateral and bilateral cooperation in 
cyberspace. To a large extent a mature cyber policy in general 
extends to more engagement and cooperation on cyber issues. One 
of the main ways for countries with less developed cyber security 
maturity is to engage in cooperation between Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERT’s). There are some regional 
initiatives enabling this, such as the APCERT which covers the 
Asia-Pacific Region and where Myanmar is a member. This is a 
positive both for the development of capabilities within countries, 
and to foster cooperation and information-sharing between 
countries and national CERT’s.87   
While Myanmar participates in APCERT, as well as some 
bilateral capacity building programs with India and Singapore, 
among other. The country has not so far engaged other countries 
beyond capacity-building programs.88 
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